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55 
WHY MARTHA STEWART DID NOT VIOLATE RULE 10B-
5: ON TIPPING, PIGGYBACKING, FRONT-RUNNING AND 
THE FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF SECURITIES BROKERS© 
Ray J. Grzebielski∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On December 27, 2001, Martha Stewart sold all her shares in 
ImClone Systems Corp. (“ImClone”) after her securities broker told her 
ImClone’s president was trying to sell all his ImClone stock and one of 
his family members sold all her stock.1  The next day, ImClone 
announced that the Food and Drug Administration had refused 
ImClone’s Biologics Licensing Application for approval of the cancer 
drug Erbitux.2  After this press release, ImClone’s stock declined 
precipitously from $55.25 to $45.39.3 
Subsequently, the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) investigated Martha 
 
© All rights reserved 
∗ Associate Professor, DePaul University College of Law.  B.A. 1970, Northwestern University; 
M.B.A. 1981, University of Chicago; J.D. 1973, Northwestern University; LL.M. 1978, 
Georgetown University.  Member of the Illinois Bar.  The author is greatly indebted to Hallie Diego 
for her administrative assistance and to Maria Willmer for her research help on this article. 
 1. Superseding Indictment, United States v. Martha Stewart and Peter Bacanovic, 305 F. 
Supp. 2d 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), reprinted in 36th Annual Institute on Securities Regulation, 1401, 
1407-08 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 3303, 2004), WL 1455 PLI/Corp 
1357 [hereinafter Superseding Indictment] (reprinting a copy of the superseding indictment, from 
which many of the factual statements about Martha Stewart’s trading in ImClone’s stock are taken). 
 2. Id. at 1408.  According to the indictment: 
On or about October 31, 2001, ImClone submitted to the United States Food and Drug 
Administration . . . a Biologics Licensing Application . . . for approval of Erbitux. . . 
Pursuant to FDA regulations, within 60 days following the submission of [an 
Application], the FDA must decide whether [it] is administratively and scientifically 
complete to be accepted for FDA review.  Only if [an Application] is accepted for filing 
does the FDA review the application to determine whether the proposed treatment will 
be approved. 
Id. at 1405-06. 
 3. Id. at 1408. 
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Stewart’s sale of ImClone stock.4  The DOJ indicted Martha Stewart for 
conspiracy to obstruct justice in the course of the investigation and for 
making false statements,5 but did not charge her with insider trading.6  
The SEC brought civil charges against Martha Stewart, including a 
charge for insider trading in ImClone stock.7  Subsequently, a jury 
convicted Martha Stewart on four counts of perjury and obstruction of 
justice.8 
This article will set out to show that Martha Stewart did not engage 
in insider trading.  First, the article will present the legal standards for 
insider trading.  Then, the article will examine whether Martha Stewart 
received an improper tip from Sam Waksal, the president of ImClone 
and a personal friend of Martha Stewart.  The article will then proceed to 
look at whether Martha Stewart’s knowledge of Waksal’s attempted 
 
 4. Id. 1409-35 (identifying the indictment’s allegations as to Martha Stewart’s and Peter 
Bacanovic’s statements and behavior in the course of the investigation). 
 5. Id.  Since Martha Stewart apparently feared her trading in ImClone stock was illegal, she 
did not have to cooperate with federal investigators.  Without her statements to investigators, there 
was no basis for her conviction.  
 6. There is some evidence in the indictment that DOJ seriously considered charging Martha 
Stewart with insider trading but then thought better of it.  See id. at 1403-05.  For example, the 
indictment contains excerpts of Merrill Lynch’s policies prohibiting its employees from disclosing 
information about customers’ trades.  Id.  See infra note 150 for an excerpt of Merrill Lynch’s 
policies.  That indictment also includes statements that Martha Stewart was licensed by the National 
Association of Securities Dealers and worked as a securities broker before forming Martha Stewart 
Living, Omnimedia, Inc.  Superseding Indictment, supra note 1, at 1402.  Yet, it would not be 
necessary to include these statements in a charge for either the obstruction of justice or for making 
false statements.  While the DOJ did not indict Martha Stewart for insider trading in ImClone stock, 
it did indict her on one count of securities fraud for publicly reiterating statements to the SEC, FBI, 
and the United States Attorney’s Office in press releases issued on behalf of her company, Martha 
Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc.  Id. at 1436-42 (listing count nine of the indictment).  Those 
statements were alleged to be false and material to traders in Stewart’s company’s stock.  Id.  The 
district court ultimately directed a verdict of acquittal in Martha Stewart’s favor on the basis that the 
prosecution had not made a sufficient showing that a jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Stewart had the requisite state of mind to be found guilty of securities fraud.  United States v. 
Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d 368, 369-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  Like the obstruction of justice charges, had 
Martha Stewart said nothing or merely “no comment,” there would have been no basis for the 
securities charge. 
 7. Complaint at para. 1, SEC v. Stewart, No. 03 CV 4070 (NRB) (S.D.N.Y. filed June 4, 
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18169.htm.  On August 7, 2006, 
the SEC announced it had reached a settlement of the insider trading charges against Martha 
Stewart.  SEC Lit. Rel. No. 19794 (August 7, 2006).  Stewart agreed to disgorge $45,673, which 
includes the losses she avoided trading ImClone stock, plus prejudgment interest for a total of 
$58,062.  She also agreed to a civil penalty of $137,019, a five year bar from serving as a director of 
a public company, and a five year limitation prohibiting her from participating in certain financial 
reporting activities.  See, http://www.sec.gov.litigation/litreleases/2006/lr19794.htm.   As of the date 
of this article, the SEC charges are still pending. 
 8. See United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 279 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming both Martha 
Stewart’s and Peter Bacanovic’s convictions). 
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trading constituted material nonpublic information on which she 
improperly traded.  Lastly, the article will examine whether Peter 
Bacanovic’s breach of Merrill Lynch’s confidentiality policy in telling 
Martha Stewart of another customer’s trading provided a basis for a rule 
10b-5 violation. 
The conclusion of this article is that there are no established facts 
that Martha Stewart owed anyone a fiduciary duty, nor that she inherited 
anyone else’s duty, which should result in a violation of rule 10b-5.  
When Martha Stewart misled investigators about her trading, she feared 
wrongly that her trading was illegal. 
II.  THE SUPREME COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW OF INSIDER 
TRADING 
Neither section 10(b)9 nor rule 10b-510 under the 1934 Securities 
Exchange Act11 (“1934 Act”) explicitly forbid trading on material12 
nonpublic information.13  In three cases, the Supreme Court established 
 
 9. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange. . . To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or 
any securities-based swap agreement (as defined in section 206B of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act), any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of 
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate 
in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000). 
 10. Rule 10b-5 provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate 
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007). 
 11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000). 
 12. In Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the Supreme Court adopted a materiality standard for rule 10b-
5.  485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988).  Previously, in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., the Court said 
that “[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder 
would consider it important in deciding how to vote.”  426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976),  In Basic, the 
Court adopted the same standard for purchases and sales under rule 10b-5.  Basic, 485 U.S. at 232. 
 13. In fact, in the original 1934 Securities Exchange Act, only section 16(b) speaks directly to 
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the parameters for finding such a violation. 
In the first case, Chiarella v. United States,14 the Court held that 
anyone trading in securities must breach a fiduciary duty owed to the 
other party to the transaction in order to violate rule 10b-5 for failing to 
disclose material nonpublic information.15  Chiarella was an employee of 
a financial printer.16  While at work, Chiarella became aware of five 
corporate takeover bids.17  Chiarella purchased stock in the targets of 
these takeovers before the public announcement of the bids.18  
Immediately after their announcement, he sold his stock and realized, in 
the aggregate, a profit of approximately $30,000.19 
The Court characterized the charges against Chiarella as involving 
“the legal effect of [his] silence.”20  The district court’s jury instructions 
allowed Chiarella’s conviction for failing to tell the sellers of target 
company stock of the impending takeover bids.21  After an examination 
of precedent, and resort to the common law of fraud,22 the Court 
 
the abuse of information in securities trading.  15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2000).  That section provides a 
civil remedy whereby officers, directors, and shareholders of more than ten percent of a class of 
equity securities registered under the 1934 Act may be liable to disgorge profits from any purchase 
and sale or sale and purchase of securities within six months to the issuer of securities.  Id.  Of 
course, with congressional amendments to the 1934 Act, Congress showed approval of the 
interpretation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 to prohibit some trading on material nonpublic 
information.  See, for example, section 21A, 15 U.S.C § 78u-1 (2000), where Congress explicitly 
gave the SEC the authority to seek disgorgement of profits made or losses avoided in insider trading 
and to obtain penalties for such trading up to three times such profits or losses. 
 14. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
 15. Id. at 224-35.  The Chiarella Court focused on whether Chiarella owed any duty to the 
security holders who sold shares to him.  Id. at 232-33. 
 16. Id. at 224. 
 17. Id.  Four of the five takeover bids were tender offers, and one was a corporate merger.  Id. 
at 224 n.1. 
 18. Id. at 224. 
 19. Id.  Prior to the criminal charges in this case, Chiarella settled with the SEC and agreed to 
disgorge his profits.  Id. 
 20. Id. at 226. 
 21. Id.  In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger argued for a broader reading of the jury 
instructions.  Id. at 243-44 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 22. The Supreme Court has recognized that the common law developed around transactions, 
which differed greatly from securities traded on impersonal markets.  In SEC v. Capital Gains 
Research Bureau, the Court said: 
There has also been a growing recognition by common-law courts that the doctrines of 
fraud and deceit which developed around transactions involving land and other tangible 
items of wealth are ill-suited to the sale of such intangibles as advice and securities, and 
that, accordingly, the doctrines must be adapted to the merchandise in issue. 
375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963). 
Further, in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, the Court stated: 
[T]he antifraud provisions of the securities laws are not coextensive with common-law 
doctrines of fraud.  Indeed, an important purpose of the federal securities statutes was to 
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concluded that nondisclosure of material nonpublic information can 
violate rule 10b-5, but only if there is “a duty to disclose arising from a 
relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction.”23  
The Court found “[t]hat the relationship between a corporate insider and 
the stockholders of his corporation gives rise to a disclosure obligation is 
not a novel twist of the law.”24  The Court thereby accepted 
administrative and judicial developments prohibiting trading on material 
nonpublic information by persons with a corporate position.”25 
Since Chiarella was “a complete stranger who dealt with the sellers 
only through impersonal market transactions,” the Court reversed 
Chiarella’s conviction.26  While corporate insiders always have a 
relationship of trust and confidence with the stockholders of their 
company, there is no general duty between traders in all market 
transactions to disclose material nonpublic information they possess or 
to refrain from trading.27  The Court explicitly rejected the position that 
section 10(b) required equal access to material information.28 
In the second Supreme Court case, Dirks v. SEC,29 the Court 
clarified the manner in which “tippees” of material nonpublic 
information can violate rule 10b-5.30  A former officer of Equity 
Funding of America told Dirks, an insurance company securities analyst, 
 
rectify perceived deficiencies in the available common-law protections by establishing 
higher standards of conduct in the securities industry.  We therefore find reference to the 
common law in this instance unavailing. 
459 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1983) (footnote and citations omitted).  Yet, in Chiarella, the Supreme Court 
resorted to concepts of common law fraud without any explanation of how those doctrines served 
the purposes of the federal securities laws. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 225-37. 
 23. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230. 
 24. Id. at 227.  The Supreme Court validated administrative and judicial developments in 
interpreting rule 10b-5 to forbid trading on corporate information by corporate insiders.  Id. at 230.  
The Court ultimately left open whether trading on information not concerning the earning power or 
operations of the company – so-called “market information” – might violate rule 10b-5.  See id.  
The Court did not decide if a breach of duty to a nontrading party connected to a securities 
transaction or misappropriation of someone’s information used in trading can violate rule 10b-5.  Id. 
at 235-37.  In other words, when the party defrauded did not trade in securities, can there be 
securities fraud?  Chief Justice Burger argued in his dissent that the misappropriation of information 
gave rise to a duty between the parties to a transaction and, therefore, resulted in a violation of rule 
10b-5.  Id. at 240. 
 25. Id. at 230. 
 26. Id. at 232-33. 
 27. Id. at 233. 
 28. Id. at 231-33 (refusing to find that section 10b-5 prohibits any informational advantages 
that certain buyers or sellers might possess over other traders in a transaction). 
 29. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 30. Id. at 661-65. 
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that the company’s assets were “vastly overstated.”31  Dirks investigated 
what turned out to be a massive fraud.32  As he discovered more facts, he 
shared what information he uncovered with clients and investors, some 
of whom sold their shares of Equity Funding stock.33 
In an SEC administrative proceeding, the SEC concluded that 
“[w]here ‘tippees’—regardless of their motivation or occupation—come 
into possession of material ‘corporate information that they know is 
confidential and know or should know came from a corporate insider,’ 
they must either publicly disclose that information or refrain from 
trading.”34  Even though the SEC merely censured Dirks, he appealed.35  
A divided panel for the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
affirmed the censure.36 
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals.37  Previously, the 
Supreme Court held in Chiarella v. United States38 that a fiduciary 
relationship between parties to a securities trade was a necessary element 
of a rule 10b-5 violation for insider trading.39  As the Supreme Court 
observed, the “typical tippee has no such relationships [with 
shareholders].”40  The SEC argued that, when Dirks received material, 
nonpublic information from Equity Funding insiders, he automatically 
inherited their duties to the company’s shareholders.41  The Court rightly 
rejected the SEC’s position as no different from requiring equal access 
to material information, a position explicitly rejected in Chiarella.42  The 
 
 31. Id. at 649.  Other employees of Equity Funding confirmed this information.  Id. 
 32. Id. at 649-50.  Equity Funding itself went into receivership.  Id. at 650.  Twenty-two 
persons, including many Equity Funding officers and directors, were indicted and were found or 
pled guilty to at least one charge.  Id. at 650 n.4. 
 33. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 649.  In fact, before the SEC suspended trading in Equity Funding 
stock, Dirks’ clients sold almost $15 million of Equity Funding stock.  Id. at 670 (Blackmun, C.J., 
dissenting).  The majority gave Dirks some credit for exposing the fraud at Equity Finding.  Id. at 
652 n.8., The dissent, however, doubted whether Dirks played a substantial role in bringing the 
fraud to light.  Id. at 677 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 34. Id. at 651 (quoting 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1407 (1981)). 
 35. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 652.  The SEC gave credit to Dirks for a role in uncovering the fraud at 
Equity Funding when it only slapped his wrist with the censure.  Id. at 651-52. 
 36. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 846 (1982).  In the single opinion issued by the Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, the court offered two grounds to affirm Dirks’ censure.  Id. at 839-40.  
First, Dirks automatically assumed the fiduciary obligations of an insider when he used corporate 
information before general public dissemination.  Id. at 839.  Second, Dirks owed special duties due 
to his position in the market as an employee of a securities broker-dealer.  Id. at 840. 
 37. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 652. 
 38. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
 39. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654-55. 
 40. Id. at 655. 
 41. Id. at 655-56. 
 42. Id. at 657. 
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restrictions on insider trading do not come into play due to “one’s ability 
to acquire information because of his position in the market.”43 
Although the Court rejected any automatically inherited fiduciary 
duty from insiders to tippees due to possession of nonpublic information, 
the Court said that “[t]he need for a ban on some tippee trading is 
clear.”44  To hold otherwise would allow an insider to engage in 
“devious dealings in the name of others that the trustee could not 
conduct [on] his own.”45  The Court stated that “[the] tippee’s obligation 
has been viewed as arising from his role as a participant after the fact in 
the insider’s breach of a fiduciary duty.”46  Only if the insider breaches a 
fiduciary duty by disclosing information to a tippee for an improper 
purpose does a rule 10b-5 violation result.47  For an improper purpose, 
the insider must personally benefit, directly or indirectly, from the 
disclosure,48 although the benefit need not be pecuniary.49  An insider’s 
gift of information to a tippee or the hope of some benefit to the tipper’s 
reputation that could translate into future earnings would qualify.50  
Since the Equity Funding insiders disclosed information to Dirks to 
expose fraud and not for personal gain, the Court found Dirks did not 
violate rule 10b-5 as a tippee who was a participant in an insider’s 
breach of duty.51 
For a tippee to violate rule 10b-5, not only must the tipper breach a 
duty by disclosing the information to the tippee for an improper purpose, 
but the tippee must know of the breach.52  Consequently, it is impossible 
for a tipper to violate rule 10b-5 if the tippee does not know that the 
tipper has breached any duty.   
In the third and final case, the Supreme Court decided in United 
States v. O’Hagan53 that misappropriation of information for use in 
 
 43. Id. at 657-58 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231-32 n.14). 
 44. Id. at 659. 
 45. Id. at 659 (quoting Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 271 (1951)). 
 46. Id. (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 n.12) (alteration in original). 
 47. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 661-62. 
 48. Id. at 662. 
 49. Id. at 663-64. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 667. 
 52. Id. at 660.  In fact, the Court required that “the tippee knows or should know that there has 
been a breach.”  Id.  In the opinion, the test only reads that the tippee “know[s]” of the breach.  Id.  
If the test includes the formulation that the tippee “should know,” the tippee could be found to 
violate rule 10b-5 on the basis of simple negligence.  See id.  Cf. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 
U.S. 185, 194-214 (1976) (requiring more than simple negligence for a violation of rule 10b-5).. 
 53. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).  Between the Court’s decisions in Dirks and O’Hagan, the Court 
dealt with the question of insider trading in Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).  In that 
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trading securities in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the source of the 
information violates rule 10b-5, even though the source of the 
information did not trade in the securities.54  O’Hagan was a partner in 
the Minneapolis, Minnesota, law firm of Dorsey & Whitney.55  In July 
1988, Dorsey & Whitney represented Grand Metropolitan PLC (“Grand 
Met”) in connection with a possible tender offer for the stock of 
Pillsbury Company.56  O’Hagan bought call options on Pillsbury’s stock 
and later purchased more call options and five thousand shares of 
Pillsbury common stock.57  After Grand Met announced its tender offer, 
O’Hagan sold his Pillsbury holdings for a profit of $4.3 million.58 
The Supreme Court said that “[t]he ‘misappropriation theory’ holds 
that a person commits fraud ‘in connection with’ a securities transaction, 
and thereby violates [section] 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, when he 
misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, 
in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information.”59  The 
misappropriation theory works as a necessary complement to the holding 
in Chiarella that corporate insiders could not trade on nonpublic 
information because they have a relationship of trust and confidence to 
 
case, a writer for the Wall Street Journal leaked to a broker what would be in several “Heard on the 
Street” columns before publication.  Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 22-23.  Trading on this information 
yielded significant profits.  Id. at 23.  The Supreme Court, equally divided on the issue, said nothing 
about whether this use of information violated rule 10b-5.  Id. at 24.  The Court did decide, 
however, that the misappropriation of Wall Street Journal proprietary information by one of its 
employees for stock trading violated federal mail and wire fraud statutes.  Id. at 28.  Although the 
Supreme Court failed to decide whether the misappropriation of information might violate rule 10b-
5 and constitute federal securities fraud, the ruling gave the DOJ a significant victory because it 
criminalized the misappropriation of information under federal fraud statutes.  Id. at 24.  In 
O’Hagan, the Court also discussed the validity of a separate SEC rule, rule 14e-3, which prohibits 
the use of material nonpublic information in connection with tender offers.  O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 
666-78; 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2006).  The O’Hagan Court held that the SEC had the power to 
promulgate this rule even though the rule does not require a breach of fiduciary duty because the 
Congressional grant of authority to the SEC under § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2000), includes the 
power to take action which is reasonably likely to prevent fraud.  O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 672.  The 
SEC has the power to prevent, rather than merely define, fraud.  Id. at 666-76.  Since Martha 
Stewart’s trading in no way related to a tender offer, there is no reason to discuss rule 14e-3 in this 
article. 
 54. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652. 
 55. Id. at 647. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 647-48.  O’Hagan remained free after the Supreme Court remanded his case to 
challenge the government’s contention that he made these purchases on the basis of material 
nonpublic information.  Id. at 648 n.1.  O’Hagan claimed he bought the Pillsbury call options and 
stock due to two public news stories about Grand Met’s interest in Pillsbury.  Id. 
 58. Id. at 648. 
 59. Id. at 652. 
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stockholders.60 
Since the misappropriation theory involves a breach of duty to 
someone who did not trade securities, the Court had difficulty showing 
how the theory fits with required elements for a rule 10b-5 violation.  
The Court labored to find deception, a necessary element,61 separate and 
distinct from a state law claim of breach of fiduciary duty for an agent’s 
misuse of a principal’s property.62  The Court found deception in that the 
misappropriator failed to disclose to the source of the information that 
the information would be used in trading securities.63  Disclosure of 
intent to trade to the source of the information is all that rule 10b-5 
requires.64 
Any fraud under rule 10b-5 must also be “in connection with the 
purchase or sale of [a] security.”65  The misappropriation theory satisfies 
this requirement since the fraud is “consummated, not when the 
fiduciary gains the confidential information, but when, without 
disclosure to his principal, he uses the information to purchase or sell 
securities.”66 
Ultimately, the Court found that: 
In sum, considering the inhibiting impact on market participation of 
trading on misappropriated information, and the congressional 
purposes underlying §10(b), it makes scant sense to hold a lawyer like 
O’Hagan as a §10(b) violator if he works for a law firm representing 
 
 60. Id. at 651-53. 
 61. Id. at 653.  See also Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (1987) (finding that 
deception is a necessary element for mail fraud); Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 
477-78 (1977) (finding that full disclosure of all pertinent facts results in no deception and, 
therefore does not violate of rule 10b-5). 
 62. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653-59. 
 63. Id. at 655-56.  Disclosure of intended trading to the source of the information satisfies rule 
10b-5.  Id. at 655.  Disclosure of impending trading almost certainly opens up the risk that the 
discloser might lose a job or be subject to suit under state law for stealing the information.  While 
the Court attempts to distinguish the federal interest in disclosure from the state law claims, those 
claims in fact are inextricably intertwined.  It will be a rare case where someone will disclose 
impending trading to the source of the information, satisfy the federal requirement, and feel fully 
confident that he can trade without exposing himself to any other legal claims or other sanctions. 
 64. Id. 
 65. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007). 
 66. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656.  The Supreme Court opened the door to a very expansive 
interpretation of the requirement that fraud be in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.  
On the one hand, the Court has said rule 10b-5 provides a plaintiff a cause of action if it “suffer[s] 
an injury as a result of deceptive practices touching its sale [or purchase] of securities. . . .”  
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1971).  On the other 
hand, the Court has also said, “Congress, in enacting the securities laws, did not intend to provide a 
broad federal remedy for all fraud.”  Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982). 
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the target of a tender offer, but not if he works for a law firm 
representing the bidder.67 
The Court concluded that the use of the same material information 
in trading should violate Rule 10b-5 whether a duty was owed and 
breached to the other trader to the transaction or the source of the 
information.68  That result is necessary to protect the integrity of the 
securities markets.69  However, any violation of rule 10b-5 must entail a 
breach of fiduciary duty.70  Consequently, the Court concluded that 
O’Hagan violated rule 10b-5 for insider trading since he breached a duty 
to his law firm or Grand Met when he did not tell them he intended to 
buy Pillsbury stock and options.71 
In sum, there are several ways in which section 10(b) and rule 10b-
5 may be violated for insider trading.  The first is the classical theory 
espoused in Chiarella where the trader, for example, a corporate insider, 
has a relationship of trust and confidence to the party with whom he 
trades.72  In those circumstances, trading on material nonpublic 
information without its disclosure would breach the fiduciary duty owed 
to the other side of the trade.73  When, without its disclosure to the 
owner of the material information of his intention to trade securities, a 
person misappropriates such information for such trading, a rule 10b-5 
violation also results.74  Lastly, a person conveying material nonpublic 
information to another for trading purposes can violate rule 10b-5 if that 
disclosure breaches a duty and is for an improper purpose.75  If the 
recipient of this information knows of the breach and trades, the 
recipient tippee can also violate rule 10b-5.76 
 
 67. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 659. 
 68. Id. at 652. 
 69. Id. at 658. 
 70. Id. at 651-53.  In upholding the SEC’s power to promulgate rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 
240.14e-3 (2006), the majority in O’Hagan failed to resolve the issue of whether the SEC’s power 
under § 14(e) of the 1934 Act is broader than the SEC’s power under § 10(b).  Id. at 672.  However, 
the SEC’s power under § 14(e) includes the power to prescribe rules to prevent fraud in connection 
with tender offers.  Id. at 673.  Consequently, rule 14e-3 is a valid exercise of SEC authority even 
though to violate the rule there is no requirement that there be a breach of fiduciary duty.  Id. at 666-
67, 673. 
 71. Id. at 660. 
 72. Id. at 651-52. 
 73. See sources cited supra notes 14-28 and accompanying text. 
 74. See sources cited supra notes 52-72 and accompanying text. 
 75. See sources cited supra notes 29-51 and accompanying text. 
 76. See sources cited supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
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III.  MARTHA STEWART’S TRADING WAS NOT ON THE BASIS OF AN 
ILLEGAL TIP OF MATERIAL NONPUBLIC INFORMATION 
A.  No Proof That Martha Stewart Received a Tip of Material Corporate 
Information From Sam Waksal 
No doubt the investigation of Martha Stewart’s sale of ImClone 
stock on December 27, 2001, began on suspicion that she sold those 
shares because she had received nonpublic information about ImClone 
from Sam Waksal.77  She and Sam Waksal shared the same broker at 
Merrill Lynch78 and were friends with strong social ties.79 
Martha Stewart herself was not an insider of ImClone since she had 
no corporate position with ImClone, whether as officer, director or 
employee.80  Nor did she have any contractual relationship with ImClone 
that would have given her access to ImClone’s information.81 
Sam Waksal, the president, chief executive officer, and a director of 
ImClone,82 was clearly a traditional corporate insider.  Since Martha 
Stewart herself was not an insider of ImClone, one possible way for 
Martha Stewart to violate section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 for insider trading 
would be if she were a tippee at the time she sold her ImClone stock.  If 
Sam Waksal told Martha Stewart of the impending FDA action before 
she sold her ImClone stock, she violated rule 10b-5.83 
Sam Waksal, President of ImClone, clearly knew that the FDA 
failure to accept ImClone’s application for its cancer drug, Erbitux, was 
 
 77. After ImClone’s announcement of the FDA decision on Erbitux and the resulting drop in 
ImClone stock price, Merrill Lynch discovered that a Waksal family member and Stewart sold 
ImClone stock before the announcement.  United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 283 (2d Cir. 
2006). 
 78. Id.  See also Complaint, supra note 7, at para. 7. 
 79. See Jeffrey Toobin, Lunch at Martha’s, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 3, 2003, at 38 
(describing in some detail Martha Stewart’s relationship with Sam Waksal). 
 80. See Complaint, supra note 7, at para. 1-13. 
 81. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14 (1982) (suggesting that underwriters, accountants, 
lawyers, or consultants can become the equivalent of insiders at least for the term of their services 
for a corporation.)  Such individuals have been called “temporary insiders,” a term first coined in 
SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397, 1403 (C.D. Cal. 1983).  In fact, the defendant in that case was 
dealing with the corporation whose information he used to buy its securities on an arm’s length 
basis and not as a fiduciary.  See id. at 1399-1400.  This case may have been decided incorrectly. 
 82. Superseding Indictment, supra note 1, at 1405. 
 83. Similarly, Martha Stewart would violate rule 10b-5 if Sam Waksal told Peter Bacanovic 
(or his assistant) of the FDA action and either told Martha Stewart about the pending FDA 
announcement.  See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657-61. 
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material nonpublic information.84  Early in the morning on December 
27, 2001, he contacted Merrill Lynch to sell all his shares.85  He also told 
members of his family to sell their shares.86  Before 10 a.m. that 
morning, a Waksal family member sold almost $2.5 million in ImClone 
stock through Merrill Lynch.87  Since Peter Bacanovic was on vacation, 
his assistant called him to tell him of the Waksal sales orders.88 
Peter Bacanovic was also Martha Stewart’s broker.89  After talking 
to his assistant about the Waksal trading, Bacanovic left a message for 
Martha Stewart with her assistant that the assistant recorded as “Peter 
Bacanovic thinks ImClone is going to start trading downward.”90  In the 
early afternoon of December 27, Martha Stewart spoke to Peter 
Bacanovic’s assistant.91  He informed her that Waksal was trying to sell 
all his ImClone stock.92  Martha Stewart directed Bacanovic’s assistant 
to sell all her ImClone shares, which he did.93 
Martha Stewart tried to reach Sam Waksal to learn why he was 
selling his stock, but she did not phone him until after she sold her 
stock.94  Consequently, Sam Waksal did not tell Martha Stewart about 
the FDA action before she sold her stock.  Nor did Sam Waksal tell 
 
 84. Any conclusion that information is material for securities trading is reinforced by the 
trading of that person once he comes into possession of such information.  See, for example, SEC v. 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), where the court of Appeals 
expressly weighed the unusual trading by insiders in Texas Gulf Sulphur stock and options to 
bolster its conclusion that preliminary data on a mineral find was material.  Sam Waksal was 
apparently so alarmed by the effect of the disclosure of the FDA’s ruling that he tried to sell all his 
shares of ImClone.  Constance L. Hays, Ex-ImClone Chief Admits Some U.S. Charges, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 16, 2002, at C1.  When Waksal pleaded guilty to some of the criminal charges brought against 
him on October 15, 2002, he told the judge that he worried the F.D.A. development “might depress 
the price of the stock.”  Id. 
 85. Superseding Indictment, supra note 1, at 1406.  In fact, Peter Bacanovic was advised by 
his assistant, Douglas Faneuil, that Sam Waksal wished to sell all his shares.  Id.  Sam Waksal 
wanted Merrill Lynch to transfer his shares to his family member’s account so they could be sold 
immediately.  Id.  Waksal’s shares were subject to restrictions on sale.  Hays, supra note 84.  
Waksal, as a probable controlling person of ImClone, could not sell his shares in a public 
distribution without compliance with the 1933 Securities Act.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a (2000). 
 86. Hays, supra note 84.  In addition to his daughter, Waksal allegedly also told his father 
about the FDA decision although he did not plead guilty to charges of tipping his father.  Id. 
 87. Superseding Indictment, supra note 1, at 1406. 
 88. Id. at 1407. 
 89. Id. at 1402.  Martha Stewart was one of Bacanovic’s most important brokerage clients due 
to the commissions generated from her accounts and from those accounts obtained due to Martha 
Stewart.  Id. 
 90. Id. at 1407. 
 91. Id. at 1407-08. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Complaint, supra note 7, at para. 19.   
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Peter Bacanovic.95  All Martha Stewart knew was that Sam Waksal was 
trying to sell all his shares.96 
Therefore, Martha Stewart did not violate rule 10b-5 as a tippee 
who sold her stock after a traditional corporate insider improperly told 
her material nonpublic corporate information.  There is no proof that 
Sam Waksal told either Peter Bacanovic or Martha Stewart that the FDA 
had not accepted ImClone’s application for the cancer drug Erbitux.  
Sam Waksal apparently failed to breach any fiduciary duty that he owed 
to ImClone by improperly disclosing the FDA ruling on Erbitux to Peter 
Bacanovic or Martha Stewart.97  All Martha Stewart knew was that Sam 
Waksal and his family were selling their stock.98 
B.  Martha Stewart’s Copying Waksal’s Sale Order Did Not Violate 
Rule 10b-5 
While Sam Waksal apparently did not disclose to Peter Bacanovic 
or Martha Stewart why he was selling his ImClone stock, the very fact 
that he wanted to sell those shares had informational value.  Waksal’s 
attempt to sell his stock prompted Bacanovic’s original call to Martha 
Stewart that Stewart’s assistant recorded as “Peter Bacanovic thinks 
ImClone is going to start trading downward.”99  When Peter Bacanovic 
contacted Martha Stewart to tell her about Waksal’s trading so that she 
would sell her ImClone stock, he employed a trading tactic popularly 
known as “piggybacking.”100 
When a trader learns of someone else’s order or trade, a trader may 
mimic the other’s trade.  This may occur because the trader recognizes a 
 
 95. See Superseding Indictment, supra note 1, at 1406.  While the indictment of Martha 
Stewart and Peter Bacanovic reports that “[i]t had been publicly reported that the FDA’s decision 
whether to accept the Erbitux [application] for filing was expected by the end of December 2001,” 
the indictment never makes clear what either Martha Stewart or Peter Bacanovic knew of this 
timetable.  Id. 
 96. Id. at 1407-08.  In fact, the SEC complaint charging Martha Stewart with, inter alia, 
insider trading states that Martha Stewart sold her shares only with knowledge that Waksal was 
trying to sell his shares.  Complaint, supra note 7, at para. 2.  In the SEC Complaint, the SEC 
alleges that only after Martha Stewart sold her shares did she try to speak directly with Sam Waksal 
in order to learn why he was selling his shares.  Id. at para. 19. 
 97. Waksal’s use of ImClone information in attempting to sell his ImClone stock was a 
breach of his fiduciary duties to ImClone’s stockholders, but he did not compound that breach by 
disclosing material nonpublic ImClone information to Peter Bacanovic or Martha Stewart. 
 98. Complaint, supra note 7, at para. 18-20. 
 99. Superseding Indictment, supra note 1, at 1407. 
 100. See id. at 1404 (excerpting Merrill Lynch’s directive instructing its employees not to 
piggyback a client’s trades). 
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profitable pattern of trading or believes that the person placing the order 
has special knowledge or information on which the trade is based.  The 
trader does not know the reasons for the trade, just the existence of the 
trade itself.  Anyone piggybacking on an insider’s trade would not be 
knowingly participating in an insider’s breach of duty.  This is because 
the insider, by trading, would not be providing anyone with information 
for the insider’s benefit.  Therefore, policy dictates that the act of using 
knowledge of an insider’s trade should not be treated as an illegal tip of 
material nonpublic information in violation of rule 10b-5. 
A tippee only violates rule 10b-5 as a participant in an insider’s 
breach of duty.101  To do so, a tippee must know of the insider’s 
breach.102  Ordinarily, a rule 10b-5 action based on piggybacking would 
be difficult, if not impossible, to prove.  Piggybacking is based on the 
trading itself as a tip of material nonpublic information.  Knowledge that 
an insider is trading differs from knowledge that an insider is breaching 
a fiduciary duty.  Corporate insiders may buy and sell stock in their 
company so long as they do so when they do not have material 
nonpublic information.103  Consequently, anyone aware of an insider’s 
trading cannot “know” that the insider is trading on material nonpublic 
information in breach of a fiduciary duty.  The insider trading stock may 
not know any material nonpublic information.  The trade may be 
motivated by estate or financial planning reasons rather than material 
nonpublic information.  Or, the insider may think he knows material 
nonpublic information, but, upon ultimate disclosure, there may be no 
movement in the stock price.  It is also possible that the insider may 
have material nonpublic information but that information never becomes 
public because the anticipated benefit or detriment never comes to pass.  
For example, the insider may become aware that the management of his 
corporation is engaged in serious negotiations to sell the company, but 
the talks may fail without any disclosure of the contemplated sale. 
Not only must the tippee know of the insider’s breach, but insiders 
 
 101. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 667 (1983). 
 102. Id. at 660 (describing how the tippee must know or “should know” of the breach). 
 103. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2006), which provides that rule 10b-5 is violated when 
someone trades while in possession of material nonpublic information.  It also provides a safe 
harbor for transactions made pursuant to a pre-existing order or plan.  Id. at § 240.10b5-1(c).  The 
order, plan, or binding contract must be adopted before the person becomes aware of material 
nonpublic information.  Id.  And any such order, plan, or contract must have set terms concerning, 
among other things, the amount of securities to be bought or sold.  Id. at § 240.10b5-1(c)(B).  In 
fact, Martha Stewart and Peter Bacanovic both claimed that Stewart’s sale of ImClone stock was 
pursuant to a standing order to sell if the stock price dropped below $60.  Complaint, supra note 7, 
at para. 23-25. 
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“. . . may not give [material nonpublic] information to an outsider for 
[the] improper purpose of exploiting the information for their personal 
gain.”104  Even if the insider is trading on material nonpublic 
information, the insider only intends to benefit himself by the trade.  The 
insider has no intention when trading in violation of rule 10b-5 to 
receive any direct or indirect personal benefit from anyone who mimics 
his trading.  To say otherwise would automatically compound any 
violation of rule 10b-5 for insider trading when there is piggybacking 
into an additional violation of rule 10b-5 for tipping material nonpublic 
information.  In fact, an insider would likely prefer that no one 
piggyback on his trades since detection of his violation would diminish. 
The existing case law is consistent with these conclusions.  The 
case law has always focused on the use of the actual nonpublic corporate 
information to trade in securities.  In a seminal case, In re Cady, Roberts 
& Co,105 the SEC found that a corporate insider must disclose all 
material inside information or refrain from trading.106  The duty to 
disclose this information is inextricably linked to the requirement to 
refrain from trading.  The vice is “the unfairness of allowing a corporate 
insider to take advantage of that information by trading without 
disclosure.”107  Tippees of insiders can violate rule 10b-5 if they 
improperly receive material nonpublic information, know of the tipper’s 
breach of duty, and then trade.108  And misappropriators violate rule 10b-
5 because they “secretly [convert] the principal’s information for 
personal gain.”109  The actual use of the material nonpublic information 
to trade or its improper disclosure to enable another to trade constitutes 
the violation of rule 10b-5.  An insider’s placing an order to buy or sell 
securities, even if on the basis of material nonpublic information, should 
not by itself constitute improper disclosure of material nonpublic 
information. 
Nor should this legal doctrine be modified or expanded to find an 
 
 104. Dirks , 463 U.S. at 659. 
 105. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
 106. Id. at 911.  The statement of duties in the alternative may not reflect any ability for an 
insider to make an actual choice.  Besides the difficulty an insider encounters in making effective 
disclosures to the public generally, the insider also might find his job in jeopardy.  If a corporation 
discovers the trading, with its attendant risk of disclosure of confidential corporate information, the 
corporation may decide to terminate the insider. 
 107. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227 (1980). 
 108. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657-65. 
 109. United Sates v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653 (1997) (quoting Brief for United States at 
17). 
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insider’s trade as the effective disclosure of corporate information and, 
consequently, an illegal tip.  Each of the following propositions will be 
examined in turn.  Should a broker who receives a sell order from an 
insider be treated as the equivalent of a tippee of valuable corporate 
information because he knows of the sell order?  Alternatively, instead 
of a general rule prohibiting all copying of an insider’s trading, should 
the particular circumstances accompanying a given order make it 
effectively an improper tip of material nonpublic corporate information? 
The focus of the prohibitions on insider trading should be the actual 
use of the material nonpublic information to trade in securities and not 
any information which may be conveyed by the insider (or 
misappropriator’s) trade.110  There are many instances in the securities 
markets where traders have access to information about orders or market 
conditions and can trade for their own account.  For example, 
specialists111 on national stock exchanges have always had access to 
information about limit orders112 in their order books.  This information, 
along with the active trading at the specialist’s post, can tell the 
specialist valuable information about the direction in the market price for 
the stock in which they make a market.  Yet, they can trade for their own 
account. 
Any regular participant in the securities markets may obtain 
information about the direction of markets from large transactions 
publicly reported or a surge in the volume of trading.  Such knowledge 
gives those individuals an advantage over others, at least in the short-
term, because certain orders, particularly large ones, can have an impact 
on the trading price for stock.113  A securities professional, known as a 
 
 110. Such “market information” does not directly concern the earnings power or operations of 
a corporation.  See Arthur Fleischer, Jr., Robert H. Mundheim & John C. Murphy, Jr., An Initial 
Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798 (1973).  
Sometimes it is useful to discuss corporate information and market information (any information not 
sourced to the corporation) as separate classifications for rule 10b-5.  However, the rule itself makes 
no such distinction.  Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240-41 n.1 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 111. A specialist is a member of a national securities exchange who can both execute 
transactions as a broker on an agency basis or can buy or sell securities for his own account as a 
dealer.  Such a registered specialist must engage in a course of dealing to assist in the maintenance 
of a fair and orderly market.  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.11b-1(a)(2)(ii) (2006). 
 112. A limit order is an order with restriction on price.  If the order is to sell a security, a limit 
order would have a restriction that the sale be consummated at or on above a certain price.  Such 
orders may not be filled immediately since the market trading price may be away from the limit 
price of the order.  On national securities exchanges, such orders are lodged with the specialist in 
the stock to be traded to be executed if the market price moves to the limit price of the order. 
 113. It is possible, in the short run, that the price change results from temporary disparities in 
supply and demand.  Or the trades may have informational content which leads to a price change.  A 
large sell order may suggest that the seller has information that the firm’s future prospects are worse 
16
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block positioner, having received such an order, may even take a 
proprietary position ahead of the execution of the order to facilitate its 
execution.114  As the Supreme Court has made clear, “. . . neither the 
Congress nor the [SEC] ever has adopted a parity-of-information 
rule.”115  As exemplified by the rules permitting specialists and block 
positioners to trade on market information, circumstances viewed as 
misuse of such information have been addressed by detailed rules rather 
than the general prohibitions of rule 10b-5. 
Additionally, forbidding a securities broker under rule 10b-5 from 
trading for his own account because he becomes aware of an insider’s 
order or telling another of the order is too broad a rule.  Since trading by 
insiders may be entirely legal, the freezing of trading by the broker is not  
informationally efficient.  So long as the broker knows a trader is an 
insider, the rule disables the broker from trading in the stock of the 
insider’s company for an indeterminate time.  All information should 
flow into securities prices with as little friction as possible.116 
While it will not appear from most insider trades that traders 
possessed nonpublic material information, the circumstances in certain 
trades may strongly suggest that an insider traded based on special 
knowledge.  The question becomes whether the presence of such 
additional facts can be viewed as effective disclosure of a corporate 
development and should not be used by a securities broker to trade. 
For example, Peter Bacanovic knew additional facts.  He knew that 
Sam Waksal wanted to sell all, not some, of his stock in ImClone.117  He 
also knew that Sam Waksal wanted those shares transferred to a family 
member’s account with the written directions “URGENT – 
IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED.”118  It was “imperative” that the 
requested transfer take place during the morning of December 27, 
 
than the current trading price indicates.  See Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, 
Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 335-37 
(arguing for the latter view). 
 114. See NAT’L ASS’N OF SECURITIES DEALERS MANUAL, CONDUCT RULE 2110, IM-2110-3 
Front Running Policy (2006).  Otherwise knowledge of such an order can violate NASD rules.  Id. 
 115. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233. 
 116. The SEC, in accommodating technological change under the federal securities, has 
applauded the increased availability of information on the Internet as promoting transparency, 
liquidity, and efficiency in U.S. capital markets.  See SEC Interpretation: Use of Electronic Media, 
Release Nos. 33-7856, 34-42728, IC-24426 (Apr. 28, 2000). 
 117. Superseding Indictment, supra note 1, at 1406.  Waksal’s account contained 79,797 shares 
of ImClone stock with a market value, before disclosure of the FDA action, of $4.9 million.  Id. 
 118. Id. 
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2001.119  In addition, Peter Bacanovic knew that a Waksal family 
member had sold 39,472 shares of ImClone for almost $2.5 million.120  
Far from a routine sale of some shares of ImClone stock by Sam Waksal, 
Waksal’s frantic desire to unload all his ImClone stock strongly signaled 
that something unfortunate was going to happen to ImClone and its 
stock price. 
The problem becomes one of line drawing.  At what point should 
one conclude that the insider effectively conveyed material nonpublic 
corporate information?  How many additional circumstances, above and 
beyond an insider placing an order, are needed to arrive at this result?  
Any rule that partially forbids use of knowledge about an insider’s order 
will have a chilling effect.  Any evaluation of additional circumstances 
will be made in hindsight.  There will be material nonpublic information, 
which the insider used in trading, with a resulting price movement in 
corporate securities.  Any facts of which the broker is aware besides the 
insider’s order will, therefore, loom large if the insider violated rule 10b-
5.  But beforehand, it will not necessarily be clear whether additional 
facts effectively disclose material nonpublic corporate information.  
Even if no formal governmental action results, the broker bears the risk 
of a government investigation going into the trading.  Due to the shifting 
line that defines illegal conduct, traders are forced to weigh the 
particular facts surrounding an order and rely on their own decision that 
there has been effective disclosure of material nonpublic information.  
Such a rule would chill a law abiding person from piggybacking on 
many insider trades even when the insider did not violate rule 10b-5 by 
trading on material nonpublic information. 
The prohibition on the insider’s trading on material nonpublic 
information is all that is necessary.  A significant policy reason to 
prohibit insider trading is to protect the corporation’s property rights in 
the information.121  Premature disclosure of information can result in the 
corporation losing some or all the value of the information.  But this 
statement of policy also sets its limits.  Putting full responsibility on the 
insider is sufficient.  There is no reason to extend the reach of the 
prohibition to anyone who merely mimics an insider’s trades.  In fact, 
piggybacking on an insider’s trades can actually lead to discovery of 
illegal activity since the volume of trading may go up enough to warrant 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id.  Also, according to the indictment, “It had been publicly reported that the FDA’s 
decision whether to accept the Erbitux [application] was expected by the end of December 2001.”  
Id.  It is not clear whether Peter Bacanovic knew of this scheduled announcement or not. 
 121. See Easterbrook, supra note 113, at 310. 
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an inquiry into the trading.122 
There is no “general duty between all participants in market 
transactions to forego actions based on material, nonpublic 
information.”123  After all, tipping is only illegal if for an improper 
propose.124  One trader can have an informational advantage over 
another.125  Only where there is an actual improper personal benefit from 
disclosure of material nonpublic information should rule 10b-5 be 
violated. 
IV.  MARTHA STEWART DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN ANY BREACH OF 
FIDUCIARY DUTY BY HER BROKER, PETER BACANOVIC 
There are, however, two other theories to explore before reaching a 
final conclusion on whether Martha Stewart engaged in insider trading in 
violation of rule 10b-5.  If Peter Bacanovic misappropriated information 
belonging to either Sam Waksal, his client, or Merrill Lynch, his 
employer, when he told Martha Stewart about the Waksal family trading 
in order that she may sell her ImClone stock without disclosing to either 
what he was doing, there might be a rule 10b-5 violation.  Whether Peter 
 
 122. The SEC, the various self-regulatory organizations, such as the New York Stock 
Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers, as well as the compliance departments 
of securities broker/dealers all conduct surveillance over trading looking for anything unusual.  In 
fact, the compliance department of Merrill Lynch originally investigated Martha Stewart’s sale of 
ImClone stock.  United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 283 (2d Cir, 2006).  Merrill Lynch turned 
over the results of its work to the SEC, which resulted in the governmental investigation of Martha 
Stewart and the resulting criminal charges.  Id. at 284. 
 123. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233. 
 124. See Dirks v. SEC, where the Supreme Court stated, “In some situations, the insider will 
act consistently with his fiduciary duty to shareholders, and yet release of the information may 
affect the market.”  463 U.S. at 662.  This statement is consistent with the Court’s earlier concern 
that receipt of nonpublic information alone as a basis for a rule 10b-5 violation could inhibit 
securities analysts.  Id. at 658.  But see Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-103 (2006), where the 
SEC has forbidden selective disclosure of material nonpublic corporate information to securities 
analysts in the exercise of its authority requiring mandatory disclosure by 1934 Act reporting 
companies.  However, the SEC has expressly stated that failures to make public disclosure pursuant 
to Regulation FD will not be deemed to violate rule 10b-5.  17 C.F.R. § 243.102 (2006).  Without 
Regulation FD, a corporate insider giving guidance to a securities analyst to adjust a faulty estimate 
of the corporation’s performance would not violate rule 10b-5 since the disclosure was for a proper 
corporate purpose.  But see SEC v. Stevens, Litigation Release No. 12,813, 48 SEC Docket 739 
(Mar. 19,1991), where the SEC charged rule 10b-5 was violated on the basis of just such selective 
disclosure.  Such an expansive interpretation of an insider’s improper purpose, resulting in a 
reputational advantage for an insider essentially eliminates any requirement that a tippee only 
violates rules 10b-5 if the tippee knowingly participates in an insider’s breach of fiduciary duty. 
 125. The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that “neither the Congress nor the [SEC] ever has 
adopted a parity-of-information rule.”  Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233. 
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Bacanovic breached a fiduciary duty in either circumstance will be 
examined in turn. 
A.  Did Peter Bacanovic Breach a Fiduciary Duty Owed Sam Waksal in 
Disclosing His Trading to Martha Stewart? 
In addition to violating rule 10b-5 through a breach of duty, a 
person can violate rule 10b-5 by misappropriating another’s information 
to trade in securities and failing to disclose to the owner such use.126  
The party whose information is stolen need not trade the securities.127  In 
order to violate rule 10b-5, there must be a breach of fiduciary duty.  
This section will examine whether Peter Bacanovic breached a duty to 
Sam Waksal which should lead to a violation of rule 10b-5 when he 
disclosed his trading to Martha Stewart.  This argument, however, is an 
attempt, in a different guise, to prohibit piggybacking, a practice which 
this Article has previously argued is permissible. 
Sam Waksal wished to sell his ImClone stock through Merrill 
Lynch using Peter Bacanovic as his broker.128  Peter Bacanovic was Sam 
Waksal’s agent and, consequently, had a fiduciary relationship with 
him.129  As Waksal’s agent, Bacanovic owed duties of care and loyalty 
to his principal.130  He could not use his position as Waksal’s agent for 
 
 126. See sources cited supra notes 53-71 and accompanying text. 
 127. See source cited supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 128. Superseding Indictment, supra note 1, at 1406.  The sale appears unsolicited.  If Peter 
Bacanovic had recommended the sale of ImClone stock to Sam Waksal, his status would still be 
fiduciary in nature. 
 129. “An agent has a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters 
connected with the agency relationship.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (Tentative 
Draft No. 6, 2005).  “An agent is a fiduciary with respect to matters within the scope of his agency.”  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 (1958). 
The term ‘fiduciary’ has never been capable of precise definition. . . .  In its broadest 
significance, it refers ‘to any person who occupies a position of peculiar confidence 
towards another.  It refers to integrity and fidelity.’  We invariably think of the trustee as 
fiduciary vis a vis his cestui que trust.  Similarly we must think of an agent as a fiduciary 
vis a vis his principal.  The clear implication then is that an agent is under a duty to act 
solely and entirely for the benefit of his principal in every matter connected with his 
agency. 
WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 140 (3d ed. 2001) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 130. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379 (1958). Section 379 provides: 
Unless otherwise agreed, a paid agent is subject to a duty to the principal to act with 
standard care and with the skill which is standard in the locality for the kind of work 
which he is employed to perform and, in addition, to exercise any special skill that he 
has. 
Id.  Further, section 387 of the Restatement of Agency provides that “[u]nless otherwise agreed, an 
agent is subject to a duty to his principal to act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters 
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personal profit without his principal’s permission.131  Further, he could 
not use or communicate his principal’s confidential information.132 
As an agent, Peter Bacanovic was entrusted with valuable 
information from his principal, Sam Waksal.133  That information was 
the very fact that Sam Waksal had decided to try to sell his ImClone 
stock.  Bacanovic used his principal’s information for his own profit on 
two occasions: (1) when, without first disclosing to Waksal what he was 
doing, he told Martha Stewart’s assistant that he thought ImClone would 
trade down, and (2) when he later instructed his assistant to tell Stewart 
that Sam Waksal was unloading his ImClone stock.  The question is 
whether he used this information in breach of duties owed Waksal and, 
in doing so, violated rule 10b-5. 
An agent owes fiduciary responsibilities to his principal and must 
not act contrary to the principal’s interest.134  Had Bacanovic used the 
information of Waksal’s order to trade ahead of him or cause someone 
else to so trade, Bacanovic would be breaching a fiduciary duty to 
Waksal.135  If an agent trades in front of his principal, his trading could 
 
connected with his agency.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958). 
 131. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 (1958) (“Unless otherwise agreed, an 
agent who makes a profit in connection with transactions conducted by him on behalf of the 
principal is under a duty to give such profit to the principal.”). 
 132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958).  This provision states, 
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to the principal not to use or to 
communicate information confidentially given him by the principal or acquired by him 
during the course of or on account of his agency or in violation of his duties as agent, in 
competition with or to the injury of the principal, on his own account or on behalf of 
another, although such information does not relate to the transaction in which he is then 
employed, unless the information is a matter of general knowledge. 
Id. 
 133. Section 16(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (2000), requires officers, directors, and 
holders of more than ten percent of a class of equity securities of a 1934 Act reporting company to 
disclose changes in their beneficial ownership.  One purpose of this mandated disclosure is to 
permit outside investors to use it to evaluate the financial future of the company.  Janet Gamer 
Feldman & Richard L. Teberg, Beneficial Ownership Under Section 16 of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, 17 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1054, 1064 (1966).  “Undoubtedly, this investment 
information function of [section 16(a)] explains why the [SEC’s] monthly summary of transactions 
reported under section 16(a) has become a perennial best seller.”  Id. at 1064-65.  Today, of course, 
this disclosure is available electronically and, for changes in beneficial ownership, within two days 
of such change.  15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(2)(C), (4). 
 134. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387.  See supra note 130 for full text.  See 
also GREGORY, supra note 129, at 141-42 (discussing three cases as classic examples of breaches of 
fiduciary duties, all of which involve an agent who took a principal’s information for his own use in 
direct competition with his principal). 
 135. Such trading is known as front-running.  See NAT’L ASS’N OF SECURITIES DEALERS 
MANUAL, CONDUCT RULE 2110, IM-2110-3 Front-Running Policy (2006), where the interpretation 
prohibits trading with knowledge of a block transaction (e.g., an order for 10,000 shares or options 
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have a price impact and cause the principal’s trade to be made at a less 
advantageous price.  As Waksal’s agent, he would be competing with 
him.136  Consequently, the agent’s use of the information of the pending 
securities trade would breach a fiduciary duty and provide a basis for a 
violation of rule 10b-5.  Such a result would be consistent with the 
policy served by the federal prohibitions on insider trading in preventing 
use of information by someone who would deprive another of the value 
of that information.137  An agent trading in front of the principal could 
deprive the principal of some value if the agent’s trading had a price 
impact which would be adverse to the principal. 
However, once the principal makes his trade, the risk of the agent 
competing with him vanishes.  At that point, the agency relationship to 
accomplish an assigned task is over.  The agent’s use of the information 
would not harm the principal.  Waksal himself could not sell his stock.  
Stewart’s sale followed the sale of stock by the member of Waksal’s 
family.  When Bacanovic informed Stewart of the Waksal trading, he 
breached no duty owed to Waksal not to compete with his principal. 
In fact, trading that mimics the principal’s may actually serve his 
interests.  If the trading causes the price of the security to move in any 
direction, it should be in one favorable to the principal.  For example, if 
the principal bought stock, and there was trading piggybacking on the 
purchase, the stock price may rise and thereby serve his interest. 
An agent can also violate a duty to his principal if he takes his 
principal’s property for his own use.138  The liability exists even though 
the agent does not compete with the principal and the use benefits the 
 
covering a like amount of stock, before the transaction). 
 136. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 393 (1958) (“Unless otherwise agreed, an 
agent is subject to a duty not to compete with the principal concerning the subject matter of his 
agency.”).  See also Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 70 A.2d 5, 7-8 (Del. Ch. 1949) (describing the 
duty an agent owes to his principal not to use confidential information obtained from the principal 
in order to compete with the principal). 
 137. See Easterbrook, supra note 113, at 339 n.116.  See also Hunter v. Shell Oil Co., 198 F.2d 
485 (5th Cir. 1952) (explaining how Shell could capture both the bribes its employee took and the 
employee’s and his confidant’s interests in mineral finds after the employee had used sensitive 
company information in a manner clearly in conflict with Shell’s best interests). 
 138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 404 (1958).  This section provides, 
An agent who, in violation of duty to his principal, uses for his own purposes or those of 
a third person assets of the principal’s business is subject to liability to the principal for 
the value of the use.  If the use predominates in producing a profit he is subject to 
liability, at the principal’s election, for such profit; he is not, however, liable for profits 
made by him merely by the use of time which he has contracted to devote to the 
principal unless he violates his duty not to act adversely or in competition with his 
principal. 
Id. 
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principal.139  As an example of such violation, the Restatement (Second) 
of Agency provides: 
P employs A to take care of the horses which P uses for driving 
purposes.  P does not use them for a month and during this period, 
without P’s consent, A rents the horses to various persons who benefit 
the horses by the exercise thereby given them.  A is subject to liability 
to P for the amount which he has received as rental.140 
The principal is entitled to exclusive use of his property.  The agent 
cannot benefit personally from use of the principal’s property without 
his consent. 
When Peter Bacanovic used the information he had about Waksal’s 
trading to help Martha Stewart trade, he breached this duty to his 
principal under state law.  His principal was entitled to exclusive use of 
his property, the information about his trading.  Under state law, Waksal 
should be able to recover from Peter Bacanovic any benefit he received 
in the form of commissions from Martha Stewart’s sale.141  He should 
not be able to recover from his agent the losses Martha Stewart avoided 
by selling her ImClone stock ahead of an announcement of the FDA 
action.142  Unlike an agent’s use of a principal’s information to compete 
with or damage his principal where a principal’s recovery could extend 
to any benefits received by a third party who participates with the agent 
in the breach, a principal’s recovery for unauthorized use of a principal’s 
property would be the agent’s benefits.  The only benefit Bacanovic 
received in using the information about Waksal’s trading was a 
commission from Martha Stewart. 
This agent–principal duty is not directed at the third party’s 
conduct, in this case, the trading.  The purpose of the federal 
 
 139. Id. at cmt. a. 
 140. Id. at cmt. a, illus. 1. 
 141. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 403 (1958) (“If an agent receives anything as 
a result of his violation of a duty of loyalty to the principal, he is subject to a liability to deliver it, 
its value, or its proceeds, to the principal.”).  See also United States v. Drisko, 303 F.Supp. 858, 
860-61 (E.D. Va. 1969) (holding that the federal government was able to recover the bribes paid to 
the defendant, but not any profit made by the contractor who paid them); La. Mortg. Corp. v. 
Pickens, 167 So. 914, 915 (La. Ct. App. 1936) (finding that the plaintiff could recapture the hidden 
compensation paid to the defendant, but that there was no further recovery for any other benefit 
received by the payor of the compensation). 
 142. See Delano v. Kitch, 663 F.2d 990, 998-1004 (10th Cir. 1981) (permitting the recovery of 
a secret finder’s fee but not any benefits from an employment agreement).  Even if Martha Stewart 
knowingly participated in Bacanovic’s breach of fiduciary duty, she also would only be potentially 
liable for the commission Bacanovic received. 
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prohibitions on use of material nonpublic information is to punish 
insider trading.  Any recovery by the government or private parties for 
insider trading is measured by the profits or loss avoided by the insider 
trader.143  Merely because there is a state law breach of fiduciary duty 
that is somehow related to trading in securities should not warrant a 
conclusion that federal law is violated.  What this line of inquiry 
underscores is that a blind search for a breach of fiduciary duty under 
any body of law that somehow touches on a purchase or sale of a 
security is a formal exercise divorced from any policies underlying the 
federal securities laws.  By finding a violation of rule 10b-5 by bringing 
“within the ambit of the Rule all breaches of fiduciary duty in 
connection with the securities transaction, [this] interpretation would . . . 
‘add a gloss to the operative language of the statute quite different from 
its commonly accepted meaning.’”144 
To find that Bacanovic breached a duty to Waksal by using his 
knowledge of Waksal’s trading is simply another cut at prohibiting 
piggybacking.  Previously, the Article presented the proposition that 
piggybacking on an insider’s order should not violate rule 10b-5 since 
the trade cannot constitute an illegal tip of material nonpublic 
information.145  To now conclude that Bacanovic misappropriated 
Waksal’s information in breach of a fiduciary duty makes that same 
conduct illegal under rule 10b-5.  The outer limit of the violation should 
be the circumstance where the insider actually disclosed to the broker 
the material nonpublic information. 
Therefore, when Bacanovic told Martha Stewart of the Waksal 
family trading, he may have misappropriated Waksal’s information.  
While he did not trade for his own account, he failed to disclose to Sam 
Waksal that he would use the information for his own personal 
benefit.146  But such use of this information breached no duty to his 
principal which should result in a violation of rule 10b-5. 
Holding Bacanovic to violate rule 10b-5 for misappropriation of 
 
 143. See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 168-73 (2d Cir. 1980), as codified in 
15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (2000), where recovery in private actions for insider trading violations is limited 
to profits or loss avoided and 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (2000), wherein the SEC can require disgorgement 
of insider trading profits and losses avoided along with the power to obtain civil penalties in an 
amount up to three times those profits or losses avoided. 
 144. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976)). 
 145. See sources cited supra notes 99-125 and accompanying text. 
 146. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 657-60 (1997) (finding that rule 10b-5 
would not be violated if an agent told a principal that the agent intended to use information for 
securities trading). 
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Waksal’s information does not invariably result in Martha Stewart also 
violating rule 10b-5.  Martha Stewart’s trading would violate rule 10b-5 
only if she were Bacanovic’s tippee.147  But in order to participate in 
Bacanovic’s breach of duty, she would have to know of the breach.148  
Sam Waksal was a personal friend of Martha Stewart.149  It might be 
possible that Sam Waksal allowed Bacanovic to inform Martha Stewart 
of his trading.  In other words, Bacanovic could have tipped Martha 
Stewart of Waksal’s trading, but Stewart herself did not knowingly 
participate in his breach. 
B.  Martha Stewart Did Not Participate in a Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
Bacanovic Owed Merrill Lynch 
As is typical of securities broker/dealers, Merrill Lynch insists that 
its employees sign a confidentiality agreement not to disclose Merrill’s 
customers’ trading.150  Clearly, Bacanovic breached this agreement when 
he instructed his assistant to tell Martha Stewart of the Waksal family 
trading.  Earlier in her career, Martha Stewart had been a stockbroker.151  
She may have been aware of Merrill Lynch’s confidentiality agreement 
 
 147. See sources cited supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Superseding Indictment, supra note 1, at 1405. 
 150. Id. at 1403.  Merrill Lynch’s written policies on confidentiality provided, in relevant part: 
Confidentiality of Client Information 
You may not discuss the business affairs of any client with anyone, including other 
employees except on a need–to-know basis.  Information or records concerning the 
business of the Firm and/or its clients may not be released except to persons legally 
entitled to receive them. 
Client Information Privacy Policy 
Merrill Lynch protects the confidentiality and security of client information.  Employees 
must understand the need for careful handling of this information.  Merrill Lynch’s client 
information privacy policy provides that -  . . . 
• Employees may not discuss the business affairs of any client with any other 
employee except on a strict need-to-know basis. 
• We do not release client information, except upon a client’s authorization or 
when permitted or required by law. 
Id.  By separate directive, Merrill Lynch warned its employees: 
You should not “piggyback,” that is, enter transactions after a client’s trades to take 
advantage of perceived expertise or knowledge on the part of the client.  If the client’s 
successful trading pattern arose from an improper element such as inside information 
you (and the Firm) could be subject to a regulatory or criminal investigation or 
proceeding. 
Id. at 1403-04. 
 151. Id. at 1402; Complaint, supra note 7, at para. 6 (alleging Martha Stewart was a registered 
representative with the broker-dealer, Pearlberg, Monness, Williams & Day in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s). 
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as a matter of industry practice.152  When the SEC charged Martha 
Stewart with insider trading, the SEC charged that Bacanovic 
misappropriated Merrill Lynch’s information about Waksal’s trading 
when he breached the confidentiality agreement.  The SEC charged that 
Bacanovic then improperly tipped Martha Stewart, and when she sold 
ImClone shares she violated rule 10b-5.153 
When Bacanovic informed Martha Stewart of the Waksal trading, 
he violated rule 10b5-2.154  That rule provides, in relevant part, that: 
“[f]or purposes of [Section [10(b)], a ‘duty of trust or confidence’ 
exists . . . [w]henever a person agrees to maintain information in 
confidence.”155  If Martha Stewart knew of Merrill’s confidentiality 
 
 152. See Complaint, supra note 7, at para. 6 (outlining Martha Stewart’s career and points out 
her time as stockbroker and that, at the time of her ImClone stock sale, she was a member of the 
Board of Directors of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc.).  That information is relevant to showing 
Stewart’s awareness that, when Bacanovic tipped her about Waksal’s trading, she would know 
Bacanovic was breaching Merrill Lynch’s confidentiality policy. 
 153. Id. at para. 18-21, 27-33.  As previously indicated, the breach of Merrill Lynch’s 
confidentiality agreement provided the basis for the SEC charges of insider trading against Peter 
Bacanovic and Martha Stewart.  Id. at para. 16-17. 
 154. Rule 10b5-2 provides: 
Preliminary Note to § 240.10b5-2: This section provides a non-exclusive definition of 
circumstances in which a person has a duty of trust or confidence for purposes of the 
“misappropriation” theory of insider trading under Section 10(b) of the Act and Rule 
10b-5.  The law of insider trading is otherwise defined by judicial opinions construing 
Rule 10b-5, and Rule 10b5-2 does not modify the scope of insider trading law in any 
other respect. 
(a) Scope of Rule.  This section shall apply to any violation of Section 10(b) of the Act 
(15 U.S.C. 78j(b)) and § 240.10b-5 there under that is based on the purchase or sale of 
securities on the basis of, or the communication of, material, nonpublic information 
misappropriated in breach of a duty of trust or confidence. 
(b) Enumerated “duties of trust or confidence.”  For purposes of this section, a “duty of 
trust and confidence” exists in the following circumstances, among others: 
(1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain information in confidence; 
(2) Whenever the person communicating the material nonpublic information and the 
person to whom it is communicated have a history, pattern, or practice of sharing 
confidences, such that the recipient of the information knows or reasonably should know 
that the person communicating the material nonpublic information expects that the 
recipient will maintain its confidentiality; or 
(3) Whenever a person receives or obtains material nonpublic information from his or 
her spouse, parent, child, or sibling; provided, however, that the person receiving or 
obtaining the information may demonstrate that no duty of trust or confidence existed 
with respect to the information, by establishing that he or she neither knew nor 
reasonably should have known that the person who was the source of the information 
expected that the person would keep the information confidential, because the parties’ 
history, pattern, or practice of sharing and maintaining confidences, and because there 
was no agreement or understanding to maintain the confidentiality of the information. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 155. Id. 
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agreement, she knowingly participated in Bacanovic’s breach of rule 
10b5-2.156  However, the question remains whether this portion of rule 
10b5-2 captures conduct which can violate section 10(b).157 
The Supreme Court has found that when a person trades on material 
nonpublic information without disclosure, a breach of fiduciary duty or 
other relationship of trust or confidence is a prerequisite to a violation of 
rule 10b-5.158  Without more, a contractual confidentiality agreement 
need not give rise to a fiduciary duty.159 
The confidentiality agreement Merrill Lynch included in its policies 
and which it distributed to its employees was contractual, not fiduciary, 
in nature.  Fiduciary duties are meant to impose obligations on parties so 
that they serve the interests of the party to whom the duty is owed.160  
When Peter Bacanovic told Martha Stewart that Sam Waksal wanted to 
sell all his shares, he was serving Merrill Lynch’s interest, not abusing it.  
Martha Stewart sold her shares through Merrill Lynch and paid Merrill a 
commission on the sale.  Consequently, Merrill Lynch benefited from 
Bacanovic’s disclosure to Martha Stewart of Sam Waksal’s desire to sell 
his ImClone stock.  There was a direct pecuniary benefit to Merrill.  
Bacanovic was serving Merrill’s interest when Stewart sold her ImClone 
stock through Merrill. 
It would be a different case if Martha Stewart were not a client of 
Merrill Lynch or did not sell her ImClone stock through Merrill Lynch.  
An illustration in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY underscores 
this point.  The example provides: 
A, the manager of P, a stockbroker, promises T that he will reveal to T 
for T’s benefit the transactions for one of P’s customers.  A is not 
 
 156. The DOJ’s indictment of Martha Stewart states that “[p]rior to forming [Martha Stewart 
Living Omnimedia], [she] had been licensed by [the National Association of Securities Dealers], a 
national securities association, to sell securities and was employed as a securities broker from in or 
about 1968 through in or about 1973.”  Superseding Indictment, supra note 1, at 1402.  This 
allegation only has relevance for Martha Stewart’s knowledge of industry practice whereby brokers 
agreed to protect the confidentiality of customers’ orders. 
 157. See generally Ray J. Grzebielski, Friends, Family, Fiduciaries: Personal Relationships as 
a Basis for Insider Trading Violations, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 467, 491-93 (2002) (discussing this 
argument more generally). 
 158. See source cited supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text. 
 159. See, e.g. Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796, 799 (2d Cir. 1980), cited with 
approval in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 n.22 (1983) (explaining that an investment banker’s 
confidentiality agreement with a proposed takeover target created no fiduciary duty where the 
investment banker’s client was dealing at arm’s length with the target); Frigitemps Corp. v. 
Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275, 283 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 160. See supra note 129. 
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authorized to make such a promise and if he thereafter performs it, he 
has committed a breach of duty to P.161 
In this illustration, there would be a breach of duty to P only if T is 
not a client of P and/or does not effect the trade through P after A’s 
disclosure.  But if A tells a client of P and the trade is made through P, A 
is serving P’s interest.  Peter Bacanovic was furthering Merrill Lynch’s 
interest. 
Admittedly, Merrill Lynch suffered some adverse consequences 
from Peter Bacanovic’s and Martha Stewart’s actions.  The SEC and the 
DOJ both investigated Merrill Lynch’s employee’s conduct.  No doubt, 
Merrill Lynch incurred some cost in connection with this investigation 
such as legal expenses, as well as possible adverse publicity from 
disclosure of the investigation and the later public trial of Peter 
Bacanovic and Martha Stewart. 
Such costs to Merrill are incidental and irrelevant.  No agent can be 
held responsible as a matter of his fiduciary duties for such collateral 
consequences over which the agent has no control.  Merrill’s remedy lies 
in discharge of its agent since there are no legally recoverable 
damages.162 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Since Martha Stewart did not engage in insider trading when she 
sold her ImClone stock, her indictment and conviction were unnecessary 
and unfortunate.  Had she never spoken with government investigators, 
the perjury and obstruction of justice charges also would have been 
unnecessary.  Perhaps, although a somewhat riskier legal strategy, her 
cooperation and truthful disclosure of the circumstances of her sale of 
ImClone shares would have avoided her indictment.  Ultimately, Martha 
Stewart settled the SEC insider trading charges.  Oftentimes, even if 
there may be a good defense to SEC charges, it can be better to settle the 
 
 161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387, illus. 1 (1958).  See also Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 403 F. Supp. 336, 340-41 (E.D. Mich. 
1975) (determining that information about a client’s account was the property of the client, not the 
brokerage concern). 
 162. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 409 (1958).  This section provides in part: 
A principal is privileged to discharge before the time fixed by the contract of 
employment an agent who has committed such a violation of duty that his conduct 
constitutes a material breach of contract or who, without committing a violation of duty, 
fails to perform or reasonably appears to be unable to perform a material part of the 
promised service because of physical or mental disability. 
Id. 
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charges and bring the matter to a close. 
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